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Single Idea 18350

[filed under theme 4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula ]

Full Idea

There are good reasons for the truth-maker theorist to reject the converse Barcan formula.

Gist of Idea

Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula

Source

Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], note 16)

Book Ref

'Truth and Truth-Making', ed/tr. Lowe,E.J./Rami,A. [Acumen 2009], p.15


A Reaction

In the text (p.15) Rami cites the inference from 'necessarily everything exists' to 'everything exists necessarily'. [See Williamson 1999]


The 15 ideas from 'Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making'

Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami]
There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami]
The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami]
The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami]
It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami]
Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami]
Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami]
Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami]
Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami]
Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami]
Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami]
'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami]
'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami]
Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami]
Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami]