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Full Idea
If a proposition is 'made' true, it has to be true 'in virtue of' something, meaning a relationship of metaphysical explanation. Thus a true proposition must have truth conferred on it in some way that explains how it gets to be true.
Gist of Idea
Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth
Source
E.J. Lowe (An essentialist approach to Truth-making [2009], p.202)
Book Ref
'Truth and Truth-Making', ed/tr. Lowe,E.J./Rami,A. [Acumen 2009], p.202
A Reaction
It is good to ask what we mean by 'makes'. I like essentialist explanations, but this may be misplaced. Observing that y makes x true seems to be rather less than actually explaining how it does it. What would such explanations look like?
| 10910 | The best account of truth-making is isomorphism [Wittgenstein, by Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 10847 | Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth [Lewis] |
| 10911 | Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 18470 | Maybe truth-making is an unanalysable primitive, but we can specify principles for it [Smith,B] |
| 18351 | Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth [Lowe] |
| 18362 | Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David] |
| 14415 | A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks] |
| 18466 | If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride] |
| 17325 | Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins] |
| 18877 | Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron] |
| 18339 | The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami] |