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Single Idea 18370
[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
]
Full Idea
We could not stand in any causal or nomic relation to a realm of propositions over and above the space-time world, ...so it is unclear that such a postulation is of any explanatory value.
Gist of Idea
A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value
Source
David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 02.6)
Book Ref
Armstrong,D.M.: 'Truth and Truthmakers' [CUP 2004], p.12
A Reaction
I agree, and I like Armstrong's appeal to explanation as a criterion for whether we should make an ontological commitment here. I am baffled by anyone who thinks reality is crammed full of unarticulated propositions. Only a philosopher....
The
31 ideas
from 'Truth and Truthmakers'
18467
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Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality
[Armstrong]
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18468
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Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation
[Armstrong, by MacBride]
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18368
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For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature
[Armstrong]
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18370
|
A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value
[Armstrong]
|
18372
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We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects
[Armstrong]
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18371
|
The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular
[Armstrong]
|
18373
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If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance
[Armstrong]
|
18374
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Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals.
[Armstrong]
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18375
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General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones
[Armstrong]
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18377
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Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth
[Armstrong]
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18378
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Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates'
[Armstrong]
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18379
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The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other
[Armstrong]
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18380
|
Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws?
[Armstrong]
|
18381
|
Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits
[Armstrong]
|
18382
|
The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there
[Armstrong]
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18384
|
One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory
[Armstrong]
|
18385
|
Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties?
[Armstrong]
|
18386
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What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'?
[Armstrong]
|
18387
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The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination
[Armstrong]
|
18388
|
Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds
[Armstrong]
|
18389
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When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity
[Armstrong]
|
18390
|
All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers
[Armstrong]
|
18393
|
For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker
[Armstrong]
|
18391
|
'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists
[Armstrong]
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18392
|
Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units
[Armstrong]
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18394
|
In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures
[Armstrong]
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18396
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The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit
[Armstrong]
|
18400
|
Properties are not powers - they just have powers
[Armstrong]
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18397
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Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result
[Armstrong]
|
18399
|
How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over?
[Armstrong]
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18401
|
The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced
[Armstrong]
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