more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
The 'thing itself' seems not be a minimal truthmaker for the thing having its particular mass. ...The thing has a great many other properties. ...It seems entirely reasonable to postulate that the object has properties that are objectively there.
Gist of Idea
We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects
Source
David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 04.2)
Book Ref
Armstrong,D.M.: 'Truth and Truthmakers' [CUP 2004], p.41
A Reaction
This is Armstrong using the truthmaker principle to argue for the existence of properties (as instantiated universals). I like truthmakers, but truths do not have enough precision in their parts for us to read off reality from them.
| 16155 | Aristotle promoted the importance of properties and objects (rather than general and particular) [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 17849 | For two things to differ in some respect, they must both possess that respect [Aristotle] |
| 15754 | Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
| 18372 | We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong] |
| 8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |
| 15737 | To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role [Lewis] |
| 10716 | There are just as many properties as the laws require [Oliver] |
| 18510 | We need properties to explain how the world works [Heil] |
| 18430 | We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards] |