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Single Idea 18379

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties ]

Full Idea

A set of determinates under the one determinable are incompatible by definition. If an object is not one mile in length, then its actual length will be incompatible with being one mile in length.

Gist of Idea

The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other

Source

David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 05.2.1)

Book Ref

Armstrong,D.M.: 'Truth and Truthmakers' [CUP 2004], p.62


A Reaction

This is a much better general version of the standard example 'if it is red it can't be green'. Armstrong uses it to give a more precise account of incompatibility. Useful.

Related Idea

Idea 18378 Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong]


The 17 ideas with the same theme [how properties might be divided into different groups]:

An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle]
An 'attribute' is what the intellect takes as constituting an essence [Spinoza]
Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong]
The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong]
Properties are 'dispositional', or 'categorical' (the latter as 'block' or 'intrinsic' structures) [Ellis, by PG]
A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle]
Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright]
We have four options, depending whether particulars and properties are sui generis or constructions [Oliver]
A 'categorial' property is had by virtue of being or having an item from a category [Wedin]
Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford]
A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider]
Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed [Merricks]
There might be just one fundamental natural property [Bird]
Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron]
17th C qualities are either microphysical, or phenomenal, or powers [Pasnau]
A determinate property must be a unique instance of the determinable class [Vetter]
Properties are said to be categorical qualities or non-qualitative dispositions [Ingthorsson]