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Single Idea 18386

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths ]

Full Idea

It is possible that there could have been nothing. ...What would be its truthmaker?

Gist of Idea

What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'?

Source

David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 07.4)

Book Ref

Armstrong,D.M.: 'Truth and Truthmakers' [CUP 2004], p.90


A Reaction

I suppose the truthmaker here is the whole of reality, with its dispositions and contingencies. But that won't do for 'possibly there might never have been anything'. In such a case there wouldn't be any truths.


The 10 ideas with the same theme [how truths of necessity and possibility are made true]:

One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong]
What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong]
The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong]
In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong]
If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K]
Necessary truths seem to all have the same truth-maker [Oliver]
The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson]
Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson]
Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami]
'True at a possibility' means necessarily true if what is said had obtained [Rumfitt]