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Single Idea 18388

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds ]

Full Idea

It seems natural and plausible to say that it is the fact that a necessary truth is itself necessary that determines its truth in all possible worlds. This intension determines its extension across possible worlds.

Gist of Idea

Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds

Source

David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 08.1)

Book Ref

Armstrong,D.M.: 'Truth and Truthmakers' [CUP 2004], p.95

A Reaction

Well said. To me (but not to Armstrong) this implies essentialism, that the necessity arises from the intrinsic natures of the things involved. The whole Lewisian approach of explaining things by mapping them strikes me as wrong.

The 31 ideas from 'Truth and Truthmakers'

18467 Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong]
18468 Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride]
18368 For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong]
18370 A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong]
18372 We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong]
18371 The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong]
18373 If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong]
18374 Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong]
18375 General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong]
18377 Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong]
18378 Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong]
18379 The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong]
18380 Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong]
18381 Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong]
18382 The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong]
18384 One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong]
18385 Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong]
18386 What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong]
18387 The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong]
18388 Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong]
18389 When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong]
18390 All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong]
18391 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong]
18393 For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong]
18392 Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong]
18394 In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong]
18396 The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong]
18400 Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong]
18397 Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong]
18399 How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong]
18401 The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong]