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Single Idea 18390

[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science ]

Full Idea

My plea, whatever conclusions are drawn, is to control the metaphysical discussion by continual reference to suggested truthmakers.

Gist of Idea

All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers

Source

David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 08.7)

Book Ref

Armstrong,D.M.: 'Truth and Truthmakers' [CUP 2004], p.107


A Reaction

...And my plea is to control metaethical discussion by continual reference to value-makers. In general, this is the approach which will deliver a unified account of the world. Truthmakers are the ideal restraint on extravagant metaphysics.


The 31 ideas from 'Truth and Truthmakers'

Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong]
Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride]
For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong]
A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong]
We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong]
The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong]
If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong]
Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong]
General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong]
Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong]
Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong]
The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong]
Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong]
Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong]
The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong]
One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong]
Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong]
What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong]
The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong]
Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong]
When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong]
All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong]
'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong]
For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong]
Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong]
In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong]
The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong]
Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong]
Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong]
How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong]
The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong]