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Single Idea 18399
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
]
Full Idea
If masses are powers, the forces generated between two particulars have to vary inversely with the square of their distance apart. Have not the masses got to 'know' at what distance they are from each other, to exert the right amount of force?
Gist of Idea
How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over?
Source
David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 10.4)
Book Ref
Armstrong,D.M.: 'Truth and Truthmakers' [CUP 2004], p.140
A Reaction
This seems like a good warning against a simplistic account of powers doing all the work, but I suspect that more sophisticated physics would offer the fan of powers a solution here. The power is to 'spread' the force around.
The
31 ideas
from 'Truth and Truthmakers'
18467
|
Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality
[Armstrong]
|
18468
|
Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation
[Armstrong, by MacBride]
|
18368
|
For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature
[Armstrong]
|
18370
|
A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value
[Armstrong]
|
18371
|
The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular
[Armstrong]
|
18372
|
We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects
[Armstrong]
|
18373
|
If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance
[Armstrong]
|
18374
|
Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals.
[Armstrong]
|
18375
|
General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones
[Armstrong]
|
18377
|
Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth
[Armstrong]
|
18379
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The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other
[Armstrong]
|
18378
|
Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates'
[Armstrong]
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18380
|
Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws?
[Armstrong]
|
18381
|
Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits
[Armstrong]
|
18382
|
The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there
[Armstrong]
|
18384
|
One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory
[Armstrong]
|
18385
|
Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties?
[Armstrong]
|
18386
|
What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'?
[Armstrong]
|
18387
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The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination
[Armstrong]
|
18388
|
Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds
[Armstrong]
|
18389
|
When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity
[Armstrong]
|
18390
|
All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers
[Armstrong]
|
18391
|
'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists
[Armstrong]
|
18393
|
For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker
[Armstrong]
|
18392
|
Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units
[Armstrong]
|
18394
|
In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures
[Armstrong]
|
18396
|
The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit
[Armstrong]
|
18400
|
Properties are not powers - they just have powers
[Armstrong]
|
18397
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Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result
[Armstrong]
|
18399
|
How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over?
[Armstrong]
|
18401
|
The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced
[Armstrong]
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