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Single Idea 18401

[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment ]

Full Idea

The metaphysical present will be a strict instant, or, if time is not infinitely divisible, the present will be a minimum granule of duration. But strict instants or minimal granules of duration, if these exist, cannot be experienced.

Gist of Idea

The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced

Source

David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 11)

Book Ref

Armstrong,D.M.: 'Truth and Truthmakers' [CUP 2004], p.148


A Reaction

He points out that this is ironic, since Presentism lies on the basic experience of the present.


The 13 ideas with the same theme [nature of the present moment of time]:

We can't tell whether the changing present moment is one thing, or a succession of things [Aristotle]
The present moment is a link (of past to future), and also a limit (of past and of future) [Aristotle]
The present does not exist, so our immediate experience is actually part past and part future [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
Time is continous and infinitely divisible, so there cannot be a wholly present time [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus]
Socrates either dies when he exists (before his death) or when he doesn't (after his death) [Sext.Empiricus]
If the present is just the limit of the past or the future, it can't exist because they don't exist [Sext.Empiricus]
We could be aware of time if senses briefly vibrated, extending their experience of movement [Russell, by Bardon]
In relativity the length of the 'present moment' is relative to distance from the observer [Heisenberg]
The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong]
The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis]
If time is infinitely divisible, then the present must be infinitely short [Le Poidevin]
The moving spotlight says entities can have properties of being present, past or future [Baron/Miller]
The present moment is a matter of existence, not of acquiring a property [Baron/Miller]