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Full Idea
Lewis suggests that we take attitudes to have properties, rather than propositions, as contents. To stand in the belief relation to a property is to self-ascribe that property.
Gist of Idea
Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties
Source
report of David Lewis (Attitudes De Dicto and De Se [1979]) by Robert C. Solomon - Erotic Love as a Moral Virtue 05.1
Book Ref
Cappelen,H/Dever,J: 'The Inessential Indexical' [OUP 2013], p.90
A Reaction
This is the sort of convoluted suggestion that Lewis has to come up with, in pursuit of his project of a wholly consistent metaphysics. Examine Lewis's account of properties before you judge this proposal! Self-ascribing is joining a set!
| 5686 | In some thoughts I grasp a subject, but also I will or fear or affirm or deny it [Descartes] |
| 3411 | How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim] |
| 18416 | Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon] |
| 2440 | Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor] |
| 3139 | Some attitudes are information (belief), others motivate (hatred) [Rey] |
| 2979 | Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons] |
| 21631 | To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them [Williamson] |
| 18020 | Propositional attitudes relate agents to either propositions, or meanings, or sentence/utterances [Magidor] |