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Single Idea 18417
[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
]
Full Idea
Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained. They fail to distinguish between logical or mathematical truths, ..between metaphysical equivalences, ..between coreferentials, ..and between indexicals and non-indexicals.
Gist of Idea
Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained
Source
Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 05.5)
Book Ref
Cappelen,H/Dever,J: 'The Inessential Indexical' [OUP 2013], p.101
A Reaction
[A nice summary, very compressed]
The
17 ideas
with the same theme
[giving full meaning by specifying some set of possible worlds]:
11968
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The intension of a sentence is the set of all possible worlds in which it is true
[Carnap, by Kaplan]
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16469
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Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions
[Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
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16470
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Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy
[Stalnaker on Plantinga]
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16410
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Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension
[Stalnaker]
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16448
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Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it
[Stalnaker]
|
7869
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Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities
[Papineau]
|
7868
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Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true
[Papineau]
|
7773
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A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true
[Lycan]
|
7774
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Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation
[Lycan]
|
9207
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If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content!
[Fine,K]
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17701
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Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements
[Mares]
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13248
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We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds
[Beall/Restall]
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14698
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Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world
[Schroeter]
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14699
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Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings
[Schroeter]
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14709
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Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims
[Schroeter]
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14719
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In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True)
[Schroeter]
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18417
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Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained
[Cappelen/Dever]
|