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Full Idea
Lewis's theory of a perspectival 'de se' content ...delivers truth conditions not absolutely, but only relative to a choice of agent/center.
Clarification
'De se' is self-referring, or indexical
Gist of Idea
A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent
Source
report of David Lewis (Attitudes De Dicto and De Se [1979]) by Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh - The Inessential Indexical 05.7
Book Ref
Cappelen,H/Dever,J: 'The Inessential Indexical' [OUP 2013], p.108
A Reaction
The proposal rests on a theory of 'centred' possible worlds, specifying the viewpoint of some agent within the whole system. It relies on accepting the idea that indexicals are special, which Cappelen and Dever reject.
18415 | The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
16392 | A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati] |
18416 | Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon] |
16390 | Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati] |
18418 | A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |