more on this theme     |     more from this thinker

Single Idea 18418

[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions ]

Full Idea

Lewis's theory of a perspectival 'de se' content ...delivers truth conditions not absolutely, but only relative to a choice of agent/center.

Clarification

'De se' is self-referring, or indexical

Gist of Idea

A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent

Source

report of David Lewis (Attitudes De Dicto and De Se [1979]) by Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh - The Inessential Indexical 05.7

Book Ref

Cappelen,H/Dever,J: 'The Inessential Indexical' [OUP 2013], p.108

A Reaction

The proposal rests on a theory of 'centred' possible worlds, specifying the viewpoint of some agent within the whole system. It relies on accepting the idea that indexicals are special, which Cappelen and Dever reject.

The 5 ideas from 'Attitudes De Dicto and De Se'

18415 The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever]
16392 A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati]
18416 Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon]
16390 Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati]
18418 A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever]