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Single Idea 18424

[filed under theme 18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought ]

Full Idea

It is plausible that you and I can have perceptual experiences with the same phenomenology of two trees at different distances from us (perhaps at different times). ..So our perceptual experiences cannot contain you or me in the content of representation.

Gist of Idea

If two people can have phenomenally identical experiences, they can't involve the self

Source

Berit Brogaard (Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth [2009], p.223), quoted by Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh - The Inessential Indexical 08.2

Book Ref

Cappelen,H/Dever,J: 'The Inessential Indexical' [OUP 2013], p.147

A Reaction

If you accept the example, which seems reasonable, then that pretty conclusively shows that perception is not inherently indexical.

The 19 ideas with the same theme [thought which depends on a particular perspective]:

16379 Thoughts about myself are understood one way to me, and another when communicated [Frege]
16391 Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves [Perry, by Recanati]
16390 Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati]
18410 Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn]
22417 Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn]
22420 The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn]
18402 Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn]
18403 Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it [Chalmers]
18409 Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features [Recanati]
16354 Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things [Recanati]
22247 Indexicality is not just a feature of language; examples show it also occurs in thought [Recanati]
22248 How can we communicate indexical thoughts to people not in the right context? [Recanati]
18424 If two people can have phenomenally identical experiences, they can't involve the self [Brogaard]
18404 It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever]
18407 Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever]
18426 All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever]
18427 If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever]
18428 You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever]
18429 Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever]