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Full Idea
For resemblance nominalism the sentence 'the rose is crimson' commits us to at least one other entity that the rose resembles in order for it to be crimson.
Gist of Idea
Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson'
Source
Douglas Edwards (Properties [2014], 5.5.2)
Book Ref
Edwards,Douglas: 'Properties' [Polity 2014], p.108
A Reaction
If the theory really needs this, then it has just sunk without trace. It can't suddenly cease to be crimson when the last resembling entity disappears.
18430 | We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards] |
18432 | Quineans say that predication is primitive and inexplicable [Edwards] |
18434 | That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards] |
18437 | Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards] |