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Single Idea 18439
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
]
Full Idea
No two classes have exactly the same members, but two different attributes may be attributes of exactly the same things. Classes are identical when their members are identical. ...On the other hand, attributes have no clear principle of individuation.
Gist of Idea
Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly
Source
Willard Quine (On the Individuation of Attributes [1975], p.100)
Book Ref
Quine,Willard: 'Theories and Things' [Harvard 1981], p.100
The
18 ideas
with the same theme
[rejection of the category of properties]:
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16621
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Accidents are not parts of bodies (like blood in a cloth); they have accidents as things have a size
[Hobbes]
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4546
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We realise that properties are sensations of the feeling subject, not part of the thing
[Nietzsche]
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6063
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Russell can't attribute existence to properties
[McGinn on Russell]
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18439
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Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly
[Quine]
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9017
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Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication
[Quine]
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7925
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There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two
[Quine]
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10295
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Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets
[Quine, by Shapiro]
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3322
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Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic
[Quine, by Benardete,JA]
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6078
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Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties
[Quine, by McGinn]
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8479
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Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things'
[Quine, by Orenstein]
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7618
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Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them
[Putnam]
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5456
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Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent
[Ellis]
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8959
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Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science
[Field,H, by Szabó]
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3906
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If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties
[Scruton]
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4029
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Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all
[Mellor/Oliver]
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16263
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Fundamental physics seems to suggest there are no such things as properties
[Maudlin]
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7965
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Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge?
[Macdonald,C]
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19121
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We can reduce properties to true formulas
[Halbach/Leigh]
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