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Full Idea
If a truthmaker entails its truth, this threatens to over-generate truth-makers for necessary truths - at least if the entailment is classical. It's a feature of this notion that anything whatsoever entails a given necessary truth.
Gist of Idea
If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth
Source
Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 1.1)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.3
A Reaction
This is a good reason to think that the truth-making relation does not consist of logical entailment.
Related Idea
Idea 18467 Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong]
| 10910 | The best account of truth-making is isomorphism [Wittgenstein, by Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 10847 | Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth [Lewis] |
| 10911 | Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 18470 | Maybe truth-making is an unanalysable primitive, but we can specify principles for it [Smith,B] |
| 18351 | Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth [Lowe] |
| 18362 | Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David] |
| 14415 | A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks] |
| 18466 | If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride] |
| 17325 | Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins] |
| 18877 | Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron] |
| 18339 | The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami] |