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Full Idea
Truth-making cannot be any form of entailment. Both terms of an entailment relation must be propositions, but the truth-making term of the truth-making relation is a portion of reality, and, in general at least, portions of reality are not propositions.
Gist of Idea
Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality
Source
David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 02.3)
Book Ref
Armstrong,D.M.: 'Truth and Truthmakers' [CUP 2004], p.5
A Reaction
Along with Idea 18466, that seems to firmly demolish the idea that truth-making is a logical entailment.
Related Ideas
Idea 18466 If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride]
Idea 18675 Kant may rate two things as finally valuable: having a good will, and deserving happiness [Orsi on Kant]
| 18467 | Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong] |
| 18468 | Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride] |
| 7005 | Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson] |
| 18469 | God might necessitate that something happen, but He is not the truth-maker for it [Smith,B] |
| 7004 | The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading [Heil] |
| 18360 | It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David] |
| 15395 | Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron] |
| 18867 | Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron] |
| 18873 | God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron] |
| 18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron] |
| 18342 | Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami] |