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Single Idea 18471
[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
]
Full Idea
The concept of 'grounding' appears to cry out for treatment as a family resemblance concept, a concept whose instances have no more in common than different games do.
Gist of Idea
Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation
Source
Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 1.6)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.10
A Reaction
I like the word 'determinations', though MacBride's point my also apply to that. I take causation to be one species of determination, and truth-making to be another. They form a real family, with no adoptees.
The
25 ideas
from Fraser MacBride
21352
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'Multigrade' relations are those lacking a fixed number of relata
[MacBride]
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21354
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It may be that internal relations like proportion exist, because we directly perceive it
[MacBride]
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21353
|
Internal relations are fixed by existences, or characters, or supervenience on characters
[MacBride]
|
8923
|
Numbers are identified by their main properties and relations, involving the successor function
[MacBride]
|
8926
|
For mathematical objects to be positions, positions themselves must exist first
[MacBride]
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18466
|
If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth
[MacBride]
|
18471
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Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation
[MacBride]
|
18472
|
Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'?
[MacBride]
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18473
|
'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker
[MacBride]
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18474
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Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have
[MacBride]
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18475
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Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts
[MacBride]
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18476
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'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind')
[MacBride]
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18479
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There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth
[MacBride]
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18477
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There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths
[MacBride]
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18478
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Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours
[MacBride]
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18480
|
Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)?
[MacBride]
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18482
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Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths
[MacBride]
|
18481
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Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein
[MacBride]
|
18483
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The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters
[MacBride]
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18484
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Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers
[MacBride]
|
18485
|
Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent
[MacBride]
|
18486
|
We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation
[MacBride]
|
18490
|
Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'?
[MacBride]
|
18489
|
Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings
[MacBride]
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18493
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Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification
[MacBride]
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