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Single Idea 18482
[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
]
Full Idea
Optimalists say that negative truths are 'true by default' (having the opposite truth value of p), and universal truths are too. Universal truths are equivalent to negative existential truths, which are true by default.
Clarification
¬∃x¬Fx → ∀xFx
Gist of Idea
Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths
Source
Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 2.2)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.18
A Reaction
The background idea is Wittgenstein's, that if p is false, then not-p is true by default, without anyone having to assert the negation. This strikes me as a very promising approach to truthmaking. See Simons 2008.
The
20 ideas
from 'Truthmakers'
18466
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If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth
[MacBride]
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18471
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Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation
[MacBride]
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18472
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Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'?
[MacBride]
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18473
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'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker
[MacBride]
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18474
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Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have
[MacBride]
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18475
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Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts
[MacBride]
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18476
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'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind')
[MacBride]
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18478
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Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours
[MacBride]
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18479
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There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth
[MacBride]
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18477
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There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths
[MacBride]
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18480
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Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)?
[MacBride]
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18482
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Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths
[MacBride]
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18481
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Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein
[MacBride]
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18483
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The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters
[MacBride]
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18484
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Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers
[MacBride]
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18485
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Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent
[MacBride]
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18486
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We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation
[MacBride]
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18490
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Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'?
[MacBride]
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18489
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Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings
[MacBride]
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18493
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Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification
[MacBride]
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