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Full Idea
If one were asked 'What makes salt soluble in water?', the most natural answer would be something of the style 'The fact that it has such-and-such structure'.
Gist of Idea
We normally explain natural events by citing further facts
Source
Ian McFetridge (Truth, Correspondence, Explanation and Knowledge [1977], II)
Book Ref
McFetridge,Ian G.: 'Logical Necessity' [Aristotelian Soc 1990], p.39
A Reaction
Personally I would want to talk about its 'powers' (dispositional properties), rather than its 'structure' (categorical properties). This defends facts, but you could easily paraphrase 'fact' out of this reply (as McFetridge realised).
| 15083 | The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale] |
| 15084 | In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale] |
| 12180 | Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge] |
| 12181 | Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge] |
| 12183 | It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge] |
| 12182 | We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge] |
| 12184 | Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge] |
| 12187 | Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge] |
| 12186 | Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge] |
| 12192 | The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge] |
| 18487 | We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge] |
| 18488 | We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge] |