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Full Idea
If we say 'being a child of our parent's sibling makes him your first cousin', that can be paraphrased using 'because', and this is the 'because' of conceptual explanation: the second part elucidates the sense of the first part.
Gist of Idea
The idea of 'making' can be mere conceptual explanation (like 'because')
Source
Wolfgang Künne (Conceptions of Truth [2003], 3.5.2)
Book Ref
Künne,Wolfgang: 'Conceptions of Truth' [OUP 2005], p.155
A Reaction
Fans of truth-making are certainly made uncomfortable by talk of 'what makes this a good painting' or 'this made my day'. They need a bit more sharpness to the concept of 'making' a truth.
| 21699 | Russell offered a paraphrase of definite description, to avoid the commitment to objects [Quine] |
| 14227 | We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise' [Inwagen] |
| 8262 | How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea? [Lowe] |
| 10314 | An expression is a genuine singular term if it resists elimination by paraphrase [Hale] |
| 18491 | The idea of 'making' can be mere conceptual explanation (like 'because') [Künne] |
| 10633 | 'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo] |
| 18861 | Maybe number statements can be paraphrased into quantifications plus identities [Tallant] |