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Single Idea 18493

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers ]

Full Idea

When supporters of truth-making talk of 'something' which makes a sentence true, they make the assumption that it is an objectual quantifier in name position.

Gist of Idea

Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification

Source

Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 3.8)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.27


A Reaction

We might say, more concisely, that they are 'reifying' the something. This makes it sound as if Armstrong and Bigelow have made a mistake, but that are simply asserting that this particular quantification is indeed objectual.

Related Idea

Idea 18492 Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson]


The 15 ideas with the same theme [opposing the claim that all truths have truthmakers]:

Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson]
Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker [Oliver]
Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'? [Sorensen]
Truthmaker has problems with generalisation, non-existence claims, and property instantiations [Crisp,TM]
Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks]
I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks]
'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni]
Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride]
Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride]
Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride]
Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride]
Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins]
Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson]
What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant]
For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO]