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Single Idea 18493

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers ]

Full Idea

When supporters of truth-making talk of 'something' which makes a sentence true, they make the assumption that it is an objectual quantifier in name position.

Gist of Idea

Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification

Source

Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 3.8)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.27

A Reaction

We might say, more concisely, that they are 'reifying' the something. This makes it sound as if Armstrong and Bigelow have made a mistake, but that are simply asserting that this particular quantification is indeed objectual.

Related Idea

Idea 18492 Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson]

The 20 ideas from 'Truthmakers'

18466 If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride]
18471 Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride]
18472 Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride]
18473 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride]
18474 Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride]
18475 Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride]
18476 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride]
18478 Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride]
18479 There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride]
18477 There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride]
18480 Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride]
18482 Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride]
18481 Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride]
18483 The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride]
18484 Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride]
18485 Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride]
18486 We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride]
18490 Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride]
18489 Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride]
18493 Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride]