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Full Idea
It is the difficulty in imagining what truthmakers for normative judgements might be that leads many philosophers to find 'moral realism' unappealing.
Gist of Idea
Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements
Source
John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.07)
Book Ref
Heil,John: 'The Universe as We Find It' [OUP 2012], p.170
A Reaction
I like that a lot. My proposal for metaethics is that it should be built on the concept of a 'value-maker'
Related Ideas
Idea 18496 If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements [Heil]
Idea 18498 Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers [Heil]
| 21455 | We only understand what exists, and can find no sign of what ought to be in nature [Kant] |
| 23883 | Minds essentially and always strive towards value [Weil] |
| 23435 | If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot] |
| 5336 | Ethics is the science of the conditions that lead to human flourishing [Flanagan] |
| 18497 | Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements [Heil] |
| 18668 | Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi] |
| 18670 | The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi] |
| 18669 | Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi] |