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Single Idea 18538
[filed under theme 18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
]
Full Idea
Non-conscious thought need not resemble conscious thought occurring out of sight.
Gist of Idea
Non-conscious thought may be unlike conscious thought
Source
John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 12.10)
Book Ref
Heil,John: 'The Universe as We Find It' [OUP 2012], p.273
The
43 ideas
from 'The Universe as We Find It'
18495
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The best philosophers I know are the best people I know
[Heil]
|
18494
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Using a technical vocabulary actually prevents discussion of the presuppositions
[Heil]
|
18505
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Fundamental ontology aims at the preconditions for any true theory
[Heil]
|
18504
|
Only particulars exist, and generality is our mode of presentation
[Heil]
|
18506
|
Questions of explanation should not be confused with metaphyics
[Heil]
|
18507
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Substances bear properties, so must be simple, and not consist of further substances
[Heil]
|
18508
|
Most philosophers now (absurdly) believe that relations fully exist
[Heil]
|
18509
|
Not all truths need truthmakers - mathematics and logic seem to be just true
[Heil]
|
18511
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Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have
[Heil]
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18510
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We need properties to explain how the world works
[Heil]
|
18512
|
Ontology aims to give the fundamental categories of being
[Heil]
|
18513
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Emergent properties will need emergent substances to bear them
[Heil]
|
18515
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Spatial parts are just regions, but objects depend on and are made up of substantial parts
[Heil]
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18514
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Many wholes can survive replacement of their parts
[Heil]
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18516
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A 'gunky' universe would literally have no parts at all
[Heil]
|
18517
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Dunes depend on sand grains, but line segments depend on the whole line
[Heil]
|
18518
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Infinite numbers are qualitatively different - they are not just very large numbers
[Heil]
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18519
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If there were infinite electrons, they could vanish without affecting total mass-energy
[Heil]
|
18520
|
Electrons are treated as particles, but they lose their individuality in relations
[Heil]
|
18522
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Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties
[Heil]
|
18523
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Are all properties powers, or are there also qualities, or do qualities have the powers?
[Heil]
|
18524
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Properties are both qualitative and dispositional - they are powerful qualities
[Heil]
|
18525
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Mental abstraction does not make what is abstracted mind-dependent
[Heil]
|
18526
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We should focus on actual causings, rather than on laws and causal sequences
[Heil]
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18527
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Probabilistic causation is not a weak type of cause; it is just a probability of there being a cause
[Heil]
|
18531
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Philosophers of the past took the truthmaking idea for granted
[Heil]
|
18532
|
If causal relations are power manifestations, that makes them internal relations
[Heil]
|
18533
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In Fa, F may not be a property of a, but a determinable, satisfied by some determinate
[Heil]
|
18534
|
Truth relates truthbearers to truthmakers
[Heil]
|
18496
|
If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements
[Heil]
|
18498
|
Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers
[Heil]
|
18497
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Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements
[Heil]
|
18500
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How could structures be mathematical truthmakers? Maths is just true, without truthmakers
[Heil]
|
18499
|
Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter
[Heil]
|
18502
|
If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities
[Heil]
|
18501
|
Maybe the universe is fine-tuned because it had to be, despite plans by God or Nature?
[Heil]
|
18503
|
You can think of tomatoes without grasping what they are
[Heil]
|
18535
|
Without abstraction we couldn't think systematically
[Heil]
|
18536
|
The subject-predicate form reflects reality
[Heil]
|
18538
|
Non-conscious thought may be unlike conscious thought
[Heil]
|
18537
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Linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought
[Heil]
|
18540
|
Predicates only match properties at the level of fundamentals
[Heil]
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18539
|
Our categories lack the neat arrangement needed for reduction
[Heil]
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