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Single Idea 18539
[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
]
Full Idea
Categories we use to describe and explain our universe do not line up in the neat way reductive schemes require.
Gist of Idea
Our categories lack the neat arrangement needed for reduction
Source
John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 13.2)
Book Ref
Heil,John: 'The Universe as We Find It' [OUP 2012], p.279
A Reaction
He takes reduction to be largely a relation between our categories, rather than between entities, so he is bound to get this result. He may be right.
The
141 ideas
from John Heil
7001
|
If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it
[Heil]
|
7004
|
The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading
[Heil]
|
7003
|
There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality
[Heil]
|
7007
|
I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative
[Heil]
|
7008
|
Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes
[Heil]
|
7009
|
Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for
[Heil]
|
7010
|
Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality
[Heil]
|
7011
|
Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes
[Heil]
|
7002
|
If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values
[Heil]
|
7012
|
If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything?
[Heil]
|
7013
|
The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it
[Heil]
|
7015
|
A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects
[Heil]
|
7018
|
Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties
[Heil]
|
7017
|
The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality
[Heil]
|
7016
|
The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events
[Heil]
|
7019
|
Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field
[Heil]
|
7020
|
Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions
[Heil]
|
7021
|
If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent
[Heil]
|
7023
|
Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities
[Heil]
|
7025
|
Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added?
[Heil]
|
7026
|
Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities
[Heil]
|
7027
|
Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality
[Heil]
|
7028
|
If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable
[Heil]
|
7029
|
Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property?
[Heil]
|
7030
|
Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property
[Heil]
|
7032
|
Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership
[Heil]
|
7034
|
Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour
[Heil]
|
7036
|
The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties
[Heil]
|
7035
|
God does not create the world, and then add the classes
[Heil]
|
7037
|
Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be
[Heil]
|
7038
|
A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities
[Heil]
|
7039
|
How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances?
[Heil]
|
7044
|
Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us
[Heil]
|
7045
|
Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints'
[Heil]
|
7041
|
Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar
[Heil]
|
7042
|
A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive
[Heil]
|
7043
|
Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties
[Heil]
|
7046
|
Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties
[Heil]
|
7047
|
Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical
[Heil]
|
7048
|
Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze?
[Heil]
|
7051
|
Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities
[Heil]
|
7052
|
Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky
[Heil]
|
7053
|
Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red
[Heil]
|
7054
|
Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views
[Heil]
|
7057
|
Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism
[Heil]
|
7058
|
Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological
[Heil]
|
7060
|
One form of explanation is by decomposition
[Heil]
|
7059
|
The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts
[Heil]
|
7061
|
Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world
[Heil]
|
7062
|
Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation
[Heil]
|
7063
|
Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical
[Heil]
|
7064
|
Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state
[Heil]
|
7066
|
If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs?
[Heil]
|
7065
|
Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language
[Heil]
|
4588
|
There is no such thing as 'science'; there are just many different sciences
[Heil]
|
4587
|
From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property
[Heil]
|
4586
|
You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology
[Heil]
|
4592
|
If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat
[Heil]
|
4591
|
Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality
[Heil]
|
4590
|
If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem
[Heil]
|
4593
|
'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties
[Heil]
|
4596
|
The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem
[Heil]
|
4594
|
A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one
[Heil]
|
4595
|
No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene
[Heil]
|
4597
|
Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties
[Heil]
|
4603
|
Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws
[Heil]
|
4599
|
Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property
[Heil]
|
4601
|
Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels
[Heil]
|
4602
|
Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels
[Heil]
|
4598
|
Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them
[Heil]
|
4609
|
It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs
[Heil]
|
4605
|
Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning'
[Heil]
|
4606
|
To understand 'birds warble' and 'tigers growl', you must also understand 'tigers warble'
[Heil]
|
4604
|
If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them?
[Heil]
|
4607
|
Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are
[Heil]
|
4617
|
A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone
[Heil]
|
4612
|
Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate
[Heil]
|
4625
|
Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional?
[Heil]
|
4615
|
Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties
[Heil]
|
4611
|
The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties
[Heil]
|
4616
|
A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws
[Heil]
|
4619
|
'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised
[Heil]
|
4620
|
Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things
[Heil]
|
4624
|
If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia
[Heil]
|
4614
|
Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions
[Heil]
|
4610
|
Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought
[Heil]
|
4618
|
If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind
[Heil]
|
4621
|
Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities
[Heil]
|
4623
|
Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery
[Heil]
|
4626
|
The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world
[Heil]
|
4622
|
Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements
[Heil]
|
21339
|
We want the ontology of relations, not just a formal way of specifying them
[Heil]
|
21351
|
Truthmaking is a clear example of an internal relation
[Heil]
|
21350
|
If properties are powers, then causal relations are internal relations
[Heil]
|
21344
|
If R internally relates a and b, and you have a and b, you thereby have R
[Heil]
|
21348
|
In the case of 5 and 6, their relational truthmaker is just the numbers
[Heil]
|
21349
|
Two people are indirectly related by height; the direct relation is internal, between properties
[Heil]
|
21340
|
Maybe all the other features of the world can be reduced to relations
[Heil]
|
18495
|
The best philosophers I know are the best people I know
[Heil]
|
18494
|
Using a technical vocabulary actually prevents discussion of the presuppositions
[Heil]
|
18505
|
Fundamental ontology aims at the preconditions for any true theory
[Heil]
|
18504
|
Only particulars exist, and generality is our mode of presentation
[Heil]
|
18506
|
Questions of explanation should not be confused with metaphyics
[Heil]
|
18507
|
Substances bear properties, so must be simple, and not consist of further substances
[Heil]
|
18508
|
Most philosophers now (absurdly) believe that relations fully exist
[Heil]
|
18509
|
Not all truths need truthmakers - mathematics and logic seem to be just true
[Heil]
|
18511
|
Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have
[Heil]
|
18510
|
We need properties to explain how the world works
[Heil]
|
18512
|
Ontology aims to give the fundamental categories of being
[Heil]
|
18513
|
Emergent properties will need emergent substances to bear them
[Heil]
|
18515
|
Spatial parts are just regions, but objects depend on and are made up of substantial parts
[Heil]
|
18514
|
Many wholes can survive replacement of their parts
[Heil]
|
18516
|
A 'gunky' universe would literally have no parts at all
[Heil]
|
18517
|
Dunes depend on sand grains, but line segments depend on the whole line
[Heil]
|
18518
|
Infinite numbers are qualitatively different - they are not just very large numbers
[Heil]
|
18519
|
If there were infinite electrons, they could vanish without affecting total mass-energy
[Heil]
|
18520
|
Electrons are treated as particles, but they lose their individuality in relations
[Heil]
|
18522
|
Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties
[Heil]
|
18523
|
Are all properties powers, or are there also qualities, or do qualities have the powers?
[Heil]
|
18524
|
Properties are both qualitative and dispositional - they are powerful qualities
[Heil]
|
18525
|
Mental abstraction does not make what is abstracted mind-dependent
[Heil]
|
18526
|
We should focus on actual causings, rather than on laws and causal sequences
[Heil]
|
18527
|
Probabilistic causation is not a weak type of cause; it is just a probability of there being a cause
[Heil]
|
18531
|
Philosophers of the past took the truthmaking idea for granted
[Heil]
|
18532
|
If causal relations are power manifestations, that makes them internal relations
[Heil]
|
18533
|
In Fa, F may not be a property of a, but a determinable, satisfied by some determinate
[Heil]
|
18534
|
Truth relates truthbearers to truthmakers
[Heil]
|
18498
|
Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers
[Heil]
|
18497
|
Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements
[Heil]
|
18496
|
If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements
[Heil]
|
18500
|
How could structures be mathematical truthmakers? Maths is just true, without truthmakers
[Heil]
|
18499
|
Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter
[Heil]
|
18502
|
If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities
[Heil]
|
18501
|
Maybe the universe is fine-tuned because it had to be, despite plans by God or Nature?
[Heil]
|
18503
|
You can think of tomatoes without grasping what they are
[Heil]
|
18535
|
Without abstraction we couldn't think systematically
[Heil]
|
18536
|
The subject-predicate form reflects reality
[Heil]
|
18538
|
Non-conscious thought may be unlike conscious thought
[Heil]
|
18537
|
Linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought
[Heil]
|
18539
|
Our categories lack the neat arrangement needed for reduction
[Heil]
|
18540
|
Predicates only match properties at the level of fundamentals
[Heil]
|