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Single Idea 18539
[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
]
Full Idea
Categories we use to describe and explain our universe do not line up in the neat way reductive schemes require.
Gist of Idea
Our categories lack the neat arrangement needed for reduction
Source
John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 13.2)
Book Ref
Heil,John: 'The Universe as We Find It' [OUP 2012], p.279
A Reaction
He takes reduction to be largely a relation between our categories, rather than between entities, so he is bound to get this result. He may be right.
The
43 ideas
from 'The Universe as We Find It'
18495
|
The best philosophers I know are the best people I know
[Heil]
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18494
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Using a technical vocabulary actually prevents discussion of the presuppositions
[Heil]
|
18505
|
Fundamental ontology aims at the preconditions for any true theory
[Heil]
|
18504
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Only particulars exist, and generality is our mode of presentation
[Heil]
|
18506
|
Questions of explanation should not be confused with metaphyics
[Heil]
|
18507
|
Substances bear properties, so must be simple, and not consist of further substances
[Heil]
|
18508
|
Most philosophers now (absurdly) believe that relations fully exist
[Heil]
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18509
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Not all truths need truthmakers - mathematics and logic seem to be just true
[Heil]
|
18511
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Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have
[Heil]
|
18510
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We need properties to explain how the world works
[Heil]
|
18512
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Ontology aims to give the fundamental categories of being
[Heil]
|
18513
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Emergent properties will need emergent substances to bear them
[Heil]
|
18515
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Spatial parts are just regions, but objects depend on and are made up of substantial parts
[Heil]
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18514
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Many wholes can survive replacement of their parts
[Heil]
|
18516
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A 'gunky' universe would literally have no parts at all
[Heil]
|
18517
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Dunes depend on sand grains, but line segments depend on the whole line
[Heil]
|
18518
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Infinite numbers are qualitatively different - they are not just very large numbers
[Heil]
|
18519
|
If there were infinite electrons, they could vanish without affecting total mass-energy
[Heil]
|
18520
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Electrons are treated as particles, but they lose their individuality in relations
[Heil]
|
18522
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Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties
[Heil]
|
18523
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Are all properties powers, or are there also qualities, or do qualities have the powers?
[Heil]
|
18524
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Properties are both qualitative and dispositional - they are powerful qualities
[Heil]
|
18525
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Mental abstraction does not make what is abstracted mind-dependent
[Heil]
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18526
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We should focus on actual causings, rather than on laws and causal sequences
[Heil]
|
18527
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Probabilistic causation is not a weak type of cause; it is just a probability of there being a cause
[Heil]
|
18531
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Philosophers of the past took the truthmaking idea for granted
[Heil]
|
18532
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If causal relations are power manifestations, that makes them internal relations
[Heil]
|
18533
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In Fa, F may not be a property of a, but a determinable, satisfied by some determinate
[Heil]
|
18534
|
Truth relates truthbearers to truthmakers
[Heil]
|
18496
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If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements
[Heil]
|
18498
|
Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers
[Heil]
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18497
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Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements
[Heil]
|
18500
|
How could structures be mathematical truthmakers? Maths is just true, without truthmakers
[Heil]
|
18499
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Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter
[Heil]
|
18502
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If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities
[Heil]
|
18501
|
Maybe the universe is fine-tuned because it had to be, despite plans by God or Nature?
[Heil]
|
18503
|
You can think of tomatoes without grasping what they are
[Heil]
|
18535
|
Without abstraction we couldn't think systematically
[Heil]
|
18536
|
The subject-predicate form reflects reality
[Heil]
|
18538
|
Non-conscious thought may be unlike conscious thought
[Heil]
|
18537
|
Linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought
[Heil]
|
18540
|
Predicates only match properties at the level of fundamentals
[Heil]
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18539
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Our categories lack the neat arrangement needed for reduction
[Heil]
|