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Single Idea 1855
[filed under theme 16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
]
Full Idea
Something apprehended to be good and appropriate in any and every circumstance that could be thought of would compel us to will it.
Gist of Idea
If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it
Source
Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply)
Book Ref
Aquinas,Thomas: 'Selected Philosophical Writings', ed/tr. McDermott,Timothy [OUP 1993], p.179
The
17 ideas
from 'Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo'
1846
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The will can only want what it thinks is good
[Aquinas]
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1847
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The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means
[Aquinas]
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1848
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We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence
[Aquinas]
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1856
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Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable
[Aquinas]
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1857
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We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it
[Aquinas]
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1858
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The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths
[Aquinas]
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1859
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Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process
[Aquinas]
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1860
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Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge
[Aquinas]
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1861
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The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it
[Aquinas]
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1862
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However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit
[Aquinas]
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1855
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If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it
[Aquinas]
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1850
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Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming
[Aquinas]
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1852
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For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many
[Aquinas]
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1853
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Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will
[Aquinas]
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1851
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Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind
[Aquinas]
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1854
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We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will
[Aquinas]
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1849
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Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them
[Aquinas]
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