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Full Idea
In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents, components, or parts of thoughts.
Gist of Idea
In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts
Source
Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 1.4.3)
Book Ref
Machery,Edouard: 'Doing Without Concepts' [OUP 2009], p.26
A Reaction
My instincts are against this. I take the fundamentals of concepts to be mental responses to distinct individual items in the world. Thought builds up from that. He says psychologists themselves don't see it this way. Influence of Frege.
18568 | Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery] |
18571 | Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery] |
18572 | Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke] |
18567 | In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts [Machery] |
18569 | In philosophy theories of concepts explain how our propositional attitudes have content [Machery] |