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Single Idea 18607
[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
]
Full Idea
Theory theorists deny that categorisation depends on similarity; they often propose that categorisation involves some kind of inference to the best explanation.
Gist of Idea
Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities
Source
Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 6.5.1)
Book Ref
Machery,Edouard: 'Doing Without Concepts' [OUP 2009], p.183
A Reaction
Love it. Any theory of concepts should, in my view, be continuous with a plausible account of animal minds, and best explanations are not their strong suit. Maybe its explanations for slow categorising, and something else when it's quick.
Related Idea
Idea 18604
Are quick and slow categorisation the same process, or quite different? [Machery]
The
51 ideas
from 'Doing Without Concepts'
18563
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By 'concept' psychologists mean various sorts of representation or structure
[Machery]
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18558
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Concept theorists examine their knowledge, format, processes, acquisition and location
[Machery]
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18557
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Psychologists treat concepts as long-term knowledge bodies which lead to judgements
[Machery]
|
18559
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Philosophy is empty if it does not in some way depend on matters of fact
[Machery]
|
18561
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We can identify a set of cognitive capacities which are 'higher order'
[Machery]
|
18562
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Connectionists cannot distinguish concept-memories from their background, or the processes
[Machery]
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18560
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Psychologist treat concepts as categories
[Machery]
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18564
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Do categories store causal knowledge, or typical properties, or knowledge of individuals?
[Machery]
|
18565
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There may be ad hoc categories, such as the things to pack in your suitcase for a trip
[Machery]
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18566
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Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour
[Machery]
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18567
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In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts
[Machery]
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18569
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In philosophy theories of concepts explain how our propositional attitudes have content
[Machery]
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18570
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There may be several ways to individuate things like concepts
[Machery]
|
18573
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For each category of objects (such as 'dog') an individual seems to have several concepts
[Machery]
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18574
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Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different
[Machery]
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18575
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The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories
[Machery]
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18584
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One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification
[Machery]
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18585
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Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not
[Machery]
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18577
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The word 'grandmother' may be two concepts, with a prototype and a definition
[Machery]
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18587
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The theory account is sometimes labelled as 'knowledge' or 'explanation' in approach
[Machery]
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18578
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Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed
[Machery]
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18588
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Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location
[Machery]
|
18589
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For behaviourists concepts are dispositions to link category members to names
[Machery]
|
18591
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Classical theory can't explain facts like typical examples being categorised quicker
[Machery]
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18590
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Classical theory implies variety in processing times, but this does not generally occur
[Machery]
|
18583
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Many categories don't seem to have a definition
[Machery]
|
18592
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The concepts OBJECT or AGENT may be innate
[Machery]
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18594
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Knowing typical properties of things is especially useful in induction
[Machery]
|
18593
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The term 'prototype' is used for both typical category members, and the representation
[Machery]
|
18595
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Prototype theories are based on computation of similarities with the prototype
[Machery]
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18596
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Prototype theorists don't tell us how we select the appropriate prototype
[Machery]
|
18597
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Concepts as exemplars are based on the knowledge of properties of each particular
[Machery]
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18598
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Exemplar theories need to explain how the relevant properties are selected from a multitude of them
[Machery]
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18599
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In practice, known examples take priority over the rest of the set of exemplars
[Machery]
|
18600
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Theory Theory says category concepts are knowledge stores explaining membership
[Machery]
|
18601
|
Theory Theory says concepts are explanatory knowledge, and concepts form domains
[Machery]
|
18602
|
A thing is classified if its features are likely to be generated by that category's causal laws
[Machery]
|
18603
|
Maybe concepts are not the typical properties, but the ideal properties
[Machery]
|
18604
|
Are quick and slow categorisation the same process, or quite different?
[Machery]
|
18605
|
It is more efficient to remember the prototype, than repeatedly create it from exemplars
[Machery]
|
18606
|
The prototype view predicts that typical members are easier to categorise
[Machery]
|
18607
|
Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities
[Machery]
|
18608
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If categorisation is not by similarity, it seems to rely on what properties things might have
[Machery]
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18609
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Psychologists use 'induction' as generalising a property from one category to another
[Machery]
|
18610
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'Ampliative' induction infers that all members of a category have a feature found in some of them
[Machery]
|
18611
|
We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory'
[Machery]
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18612
|
Americans are more inclined to refer causally than the Chinese are
[Machery]
|
18613
|
Artifacts can be natural kinds, when they are the object of historical enquiry
[Machery]
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18614
|
Vertical arguments say eliminate a term if it picks out different natural kinds in different theories
[Machery]
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18615
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Horizontal arguments say eliminate a term if it fails to pick out a natural kind
[Machery]
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18616
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If a term doesn't pick out a kind, keeping it may block improvements in classification
[Machery]
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