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Single Idea 1861

[filed under theme 16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will ]

Full Idea

The will is not compelled to move, for it doesn't have to want the pleasant things set before it.

Gist of Idea

The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it

Source

Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 21)

Book Ref

Aquinas,Thomas: 'Selected Philosophical Writings', ed/tr. McDermott,Timothy [OUP 1993], p.183

The 22 ideas with the same theme [defences of the existence of wills which are free]:

22504 Only a human being can be a starting point for an action [Aristotle]
14516 There is no necessity to live with necessity [Epicurus]
20834 Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
23338 You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can control my power of choice [Epictetus]
1856 Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas]
1861 The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas]
1862 However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas]
1853 Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas]
1849 Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas]
2282 My capacity to make choices with my free will extends as far as any faculty ever could [Descartes]
4310 We have inner awareness of our freedom [Descartes]
23668 Our own nature attributes free determinations to our own will [Reid]
23680 We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid]
9756 We must be free, because we can act against our strongest desires [Kant, by Korsgaard]
5597 If there is a first beginning, there can be other sequences initiated from nothing [Kant]
3740 We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled [Kant]
21965 Spinoza could not actually believe his determinism, because living requires free will [Fichte]
20322 I am aware that freedom is possible, and the freedom is not in theory, but in seeking freedom [Jaspers]
3444 If actions are not caused by other events, and are not causeless, they must be caused by the person [Chisholm]
3808 Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle]
3818 We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle]
3817 Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle]