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Single Idea 18616
[filed under theme 14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
]
Full Idea
If a hypothesised natural kind term fails to pick out a natural kind, keeping this theoretical term is likely to prevent the development of a new classification system that would identify the relevant kinds.
Gist of Idea
If a term doesn't pick out a kind, keeping it may block improvements in classification
Source
Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 8.2.3)
Book Ref
Machery,Edouard: 'Doing Without Concepts' [OUP 2009], p.239
A Reaction
I'm persuaded. This is why metaphysicians should stop talking about 'properties'.
Related Ideas
Idea 18615
Horizontal arguments say eliminate a term if it fails to pick out a natural kind [Machery]
Idea 18611
We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory' [Machery]
The
51 ideas
from Edouard Machery
18563
|
By 'concept' psychologists mean various sorts of representation or structure
[Machery]
|
18558
|
Concept theorists examine their knowledge, format, processes, acquisition and location
[Machery]
|
18557
|
Psychologists treat concepts as long-term knowledge bodies which lead to judgements
[Machery]
|
18559
|
Philosophy is empty if it does not in some way depend on matters of fact
[Machery]
|
18561
|
We can identify a set of cognitive capacities which are 'higher order'
[Machery]
|
18562
|
Connectionists cannot distinguish concept-memories from their background, or the processes
[Machery]
|
18560
|
Psychologist treat concepts as categories
[Machery]
|
18564
|
Do categories store causal knowledge, or typical properties, or knowledge of individuals?
[Machery]
|
18565
|
There may be ad hoc categories, such as the things to pack in your suitcase for a trip
[Machery]
|
18566
|
Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour
[Machery]
|
18567
|
In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts
[Machery]
|
18569
|
In philosophy theories of concepts explain how our propositional attitudes have content
[Machery]
|
18570
|
There may be several ways to individuate things like concepts
[Machery]
|
18573
|
For each category of objects (such as 'dog') an individual seems to have several concepts
[Machery]
|
18574
|
Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different
[Machery]
|
18575
|
The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories
[Machery]
|
18584
|
One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification
[Machery]
|
18585
|
Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not
[Machery]
|
18577
|
The word 'grandmother' may be two concepts, with a prototype and a definition
[Machery]
|
18587
|
The theory account is sometimes labelled as 'knowledge' or 'explanation' in approach
[Machery]
|
18578
|
Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed
[Machery]
|
18588
|
Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location
[Machery]
|
18589
|
For behaviourists concepts are dispositions to link category members to names
[Machery]
|
18591
|
Classical theory can't explain facts like typical examples being categorised quicker
[Machery]
|
18590
|
Classical theory implies variety in processing times, but this does not generally occur
[Machery]
|
18583
|
Many categories don't seem to have a definition
[Machery]
|
18592
|
The concepts OBJECT or AGENT may be innate
[Machery]
|
18594
|
Knowing typical properties of things is especially useful in induction
[Machery]
|
18593
|
The term 'prototype' is used for both typical category members, and the representation
[Machery]
|
18595
|
Prototype theories are based on computation of similarities with the prototype
[Machery]
|
18596
|
Prototype theorists don't tell us how we select the appropriate prototype
[Machery]
|
18597
|
Concepts as exemplars are based on the knowledge of properties of each particular
[Machery]
|
18598
|
Exemplar theories need to explain how the relevant properties are selected from a multitude of them
[Machery]
|
18599
|
In practice, known examples take priority over the rest of the set of exemplars
[Machery]
|
18600
|
Theory Theory says category concepts are knowledge stores explaining membership
[Machery]
|
18601
|
Theory Theory says concepts are explanatory knowledge, and concepts form domains
[Machery]
|
18602
|
A thing is classified if its features are likely to be generated by that category's causal laws
[Machery]
|
18603
|
Maybe concepts are not the typical properties, but the ideal properties
[Machery]
|
18604
|
Are quick and slow categorisation the same process, or quite different?
[Machery]
|
18605
|
It is more efficient to remember the prototype, than repeatedly create it from exemplars
[Machery]
|
18606
|
The prototype view predicts that typical members are easier to categorise
[Machery]
|
18607
|
Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities
[Machery]
|
18608
|
If categorisation is not by similarity, it seems to rely on what properties things might have
[Machery]
|
18609
|
Psychologists use 'induction' as generalising a property from one category to another
[Machery]
|
18610
|
'Ampliative' induction infers that all members of a category have a feature found in some of them
[Machery]
|
18611
|
We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory'
[Machery]
|
18612
|
Americans are more inclined to refer causally than the Chinese are
[Machery]
|
18613
|
Artifacts can be natural kinds, when they are the object of historical enquiry
[Machery]
|
18614
|
Vertical arguments say eliminate a term if it picks out different natural kinds in different theories
[Machery]
|
18615
|
Horizontal arguments say eliminate a term if it fails to pick out a natural kind
[Machery]
|
18616
|
If a term doesn't pick out a kind, keeping it may block improvements in classification
[Machery]
|