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Full Idea
My guiding assumption is that truths about value, at least, regularly entail normative truths of some sort about actions or attitudes.
Gist of Idea
Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes
Source
Francesco Orsi (Value Theory [2015], 1.4)
Book Ref
Orsi,Francesco: 'Value Theory' [Bloomsbury 2015], p.9
A Reaction
Not quite as clear as it sounds. If I say 'the leaf is green' I presume a belief that it is green, which is an attitude. If I say 'shut the door' that implies an action with no value. One view says that values are entirely normative in this way.
| 21455 | We only understand what exists, and can find no sign of what ought to be in nature [Kant] |
| 23883 | Minds essentially and always strive towards value [Weil] |
| 23435 | If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot] |
| 5336 | Ethics is the science of the conditions that lead to human flourishing [Flanagan] |
| 18497 | Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements [Heil] |
| 18668 | Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi] |
| 18670 | The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi] |
| 18669 | Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi] |