more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 18669

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity ]

Full Idea

Version one of the normative view of values is the Fitting Attitude account, which says that 'x is good' means 'it is fitting to respond favourably to (or 'favour') x'.

Gist of Idea

Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring

Source

Francesco Orsi (Value Theory [2015], 1.4)

Book Ref

Orsi,Francesco: 'Value Theory' [Bloomsbury 2015], p.10


A Reaction

Brentano is mentioned. Orsi favours this view. The rival normative view is Scanlon's [1998:95-8] Buck-Passing account, in Idea 18670. I am interested in building a defence of the Buck-Passing account, which seems to suit a naturalistic realist like me.

Related Idea

Idea 18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]


The 8 ideas with the same theme [what ought to be true as an aspect of nature]:

We only understand what exists, and can find no sign of what ought to be in nature [Kant]
Minds essentially and always strive towards value [Weil]
If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot]
Ethics is the science of the conditions that lead to human flourishing [Flanagan]
Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements [Heil]
Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]