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Single Idea 18670

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity ]

Full Idea

Version two of the normative view of values is the Buck-Passing account, which says that 'x is good' means 'x has the property of having other properties that provide reasons to favour x'.

Gist of Idea

The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value

Source

Francesco Orsi (Value Theory [2015], 1.4)

Book Ref

Orsi,Francesco: 'Value Theory' [Bloomsbury 2015], p.10


A Reaction

[He cites Scanlon 1998:95-8] I think this is the one to explore. We want values in the world, bridging the supposed 'is-ought gap', and not values that just derive from the way human beings are constituted (and certainly not supernatural values!).

Related Idea

Idea 18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]


The 8 ideas with the same theme [what ought to be true as an aspect of nature]:

We only understand what exists, and can find no sign of what ought to be in nature [Kant]
Minds essentially and always strive towards value [Weil]
If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot]
Ethics is the science of the conditions that lead to human flourishing [Flanagan]
Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements [Heil]
Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]