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Full Idea
A support for the fittingness account (against the buck-passing reasons account) is the 'wrong kind of reasons' problem. There are many reasons for positive attitudes towards things which are not good. We might admire a demon because he threatens torture.
Gist of Idea
Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear
Source
Francesco Orsi (Value Theory [2015], 1.4)
Book Ref
Orsi,Francesco: 'Value Theory' [Bloomsbury 2015], p.13
A Reaction
[compressed] I like the Buck-Passing view, but was never going to claim that all reasons for positive attitudes bestow value. I only think that there is no value without a reason
Related Ideas
Idea 18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
Idea 18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
| 6227 | Keeping promises and contracts is an obligation of natural justice [Cudworth] |
| 24085 | For absolute morality a goal for mankind is needed [Nietzsche] |
| 18676 | We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE] |
| 5918 | The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed [Ross] |
| 5930 | All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious [Ross] |
| 2942 | The sense of the world must lie outside the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 22447 | Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity [Foot] |
| 3257 | Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values [Nagel] |
| 18672 | Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi] |