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Single Idea 18684

[filed under theme 20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes ]

Full Idea

Many have suggested alternative roles or sorts of reasons, which are not mandatory. Dancy says some reasons are 'enticing' rather than peremptory; Raz makes options 'eligible' rather than required; Gert says they justify rather than require action.

Gist of Idea

Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it

Source

Francesco Orsi (Value Theory [2015], 6.4)

Book Ref

Orsi,Francesco: 'Value Theory' [Bloomsbury 2015], p.108

A Reaction

The third option is immediately attractive - but then it would only justify the action because it was a good reason, which would need explaining. 'Enticing' captures the psychology in a nice vague way.

The 14 ideas from Francesco Orsi

18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]