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Single Idea 18716

[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism ]

Full Idea

We are accustomed to look on a machine as the expression of a rule of movement.

Gist of Idea

A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement

Source

Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], B VII.2)

Book Ref

Wittgenstein,Ludwig: 'Lectures in Cambridge 1930-32', ed/tr. Lee,Desmond [Blackwell 1980], p.40

A Reaction

What a beautiful definition of a machine! I like this because it connects the two halves of my view of the 'essence' of a thing, as derived from Aristotle, as both a causal mechanism and an underlying principle. Cf Turing machines.

The 32 ideas with the same theme [explanation by revealing underlying mechanisms]:

16560 Galileo introduced geometrico-mechanical explanation, based on Archimedes [Galileo, by Machamer/Darden/Craver]
15960 Explanation is deducing a phenomenon from some nature better known to us [Boyle]
18716 A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein]
16557 Salmon's mechanisms are processes and interactions, involving marks, or conserved quantities [Salmon, by Machamer/Darden/Craver]
13045 Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon]
13062 Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon]
13063 Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon]
17093 Causation produces productive mechanisms; to understand the world, understand these mechanisms [Salmon]
17492 Salmon's interaction mechanisms needn't be regular, or involving any systems [Glennan on Salmon]
13601 Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures [Ellis]
15885 The necessity of Newton's First Law derives from the nature of material things, not from a mechanism [Harré]
15254 If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour [Harré/Madden]
15317 Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real [Harré/Madden]
16842 We want to know not just the cause, but how the cause operated [Lipton]
16528 Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16529 Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16530 A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16553 Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16559 Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
17493 Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan]
17487 Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan]
17489 Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan]
17490 17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan]
17491 Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan]
17500 General theories may be too abstract to actually explain the mechanisms [Portides]
12787 Mechanisms can't explain on their own, as their models rest on pragmatic regularities [Leuridan]
14384 We can show that regularities and pragmatic laws are more basic than mechanisms [Leuridan]
14386 Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities [Leuridan]
14388 Mechanisms must produce macro-level regularities, but that needs micro-level regularities [Leuridan]
14568 A structure won't give a causal explanation unless we know the powers of the structure [Mumford/Anjum]
17471 Using mechanisms as explanatory schemes began in chemistry [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
17472 Thick mechanisms map whole reactions, and thin mechanism chart the steps [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]