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Full Idea
To a necessity in the world there corresponds an arbitrary rule in language.
Gist of Idea
For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language
Source
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], B XIV.2)
Book Ref
Wittgenstein,Ludwig: 'Lectures in Cambridge 1930-32', ed/tr. Lee,Desmond [Blackwell 1980], p.57
A Reaction
This seems to be hardcore logical positivism, making all necessities arbitrary. Compare Quine on the number of planets.
Related Idea
Idea 9201 Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
| 18726 | For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein] |
| 15233 | If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden] |
| 15242 | Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature [Harré/Madden] |
| 13973 | A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames] |
| 12433 | If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale] |
| 15027 | If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider] |
| 15028 | Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider] |
| 15032 | Necessary a posteriori is conventional for necessity and nonmodal for a posteriority [Sidelle, by Sider] |
| 15179 | To know empirical necessities, we need empirical facts, plus conventions about which are necessary [Sidelle] |
| 6582 | Conventions can only work if they are based on something non-conventional [Fogelin] |
| 14478 | Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson] |