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Single Idea 18729

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems ]

Full Idea

There is no need of a theory to reconcile what we know about sense data and what we believe about physical objects, because part of what we mean by saying that a penny is round is that we see it as elliptical in such and such conditions.

Gist of Idea

Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them

Source

Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], C III)

Book Ref

Wittgenstein,Ludwig: 'Lectures in Cambridge 1930-32', ed/tr. Lee,Desmond [Blackwell 1980], p.69

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A Reaction

This is an interesting and cunning move to bridge the gap between our representations and reallity. We may surmise how a thing really is, but then be surprised by the sense-data we get from it.

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The 19 ideas with the same theme [difficulties with the concept of sense-data]:

6476	We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell]

8854	My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York [Williams,M on Russell]

6458	Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell]

6469	Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell]

15580

There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger]

18729

Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein]

6501	As sense-data are necessarily private, they are attacked by Wittgenstein's objections [Wittgenstein, by Robinson,H]

6493	We are not conscious of pure liquidity, but of the liquidity of water [Firth]

21686

Sense-data are dubious abstractions, with none of the plausibility of tables [Quine]

15819

Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter? [Chisholm]

3296	Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel]

15244

We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own [Harré/Madden]

7639	The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans]

3581	Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M]

6505	Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H]

4101	If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane]

4102	The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane]

6639	The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe]

4720	Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised [O'Grady]