more on this theme     |     more from this thinker

Single Idea 18729

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems ]

Full Idea

There is no need of a theory to reconcile what we know about sense data and what we believe about physical objects, because part of what we mean by saying that a penny is round is that we see it as elliptical in such and such conditions.

Gist of Idea

Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them

Source

Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], C III)

Book Ref

Wittgenstein,Ludwig: 'Lectures in Cambridge 1930-32', ed/tr. Lee,Desmond [Blackwell 1980], p.69

A Reaction

This is an interesting and cunning move to bridge the gap between our representations and reallity. We may surmise how a thing really is, but then be surprised by the sense-data we get from it.

The 35 ideas from 'Lectures 1930-32 (student notes)'

18704 Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein]
18706 Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense [Wittgenstein]
18705 Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein]
18707 All thought has the logical form of reality [Wittgenstein]
18708 Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law [Wittgenstein]
18709 Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein]
18727 A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein]
18710 Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein]
18711 A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein]
18712 Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein]
18713 If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future [Wittgenstein]
18719 Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense [Wittgenstein]
18714 We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein]
18715 Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green' [Wittgenstein]
18716 A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein]
18717 Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it [Wittgenstein]
18718 Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein]
18720 Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing [Wittgenstein]
18721 Explanation and understanding are the same [Wittgenstein]
18723 We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein]
18724 In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein]
18725 A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein]
18726 For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein]
18728 The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein]
18729 Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein]
18730 The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein]
18732 We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein]
18731 There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein]
18733 Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description [Wittgenstein]
18734 If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein]
18735 Talking nonsense is not following the rules [Wittgenstein]
18736 Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein]
18737 There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein]
18738 We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2) [Wittgenstein]
18280 We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects [Wittgenstein]