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Full Idea
The idea of 'impossible worlds' was introduced into epistemic logic.
Gist of Idea
Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds
Source
Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 4)
Book Ref
'Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophical Logic', ed/tr. Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R [Bloomsbury 2014], p.19
A Reaction
Nathan Salmon seems interested in their role in metaphysics (presumably in relation to Meinongian impossible objects, like circular squares, which must necessarily be circular).
| 16132 | On mountains or in worlds, reporting contradictions is contradictory, so no such truths can be reported [Lewis] |
| 16133 | Possible worlds can contain contradictions if such worlds are seen as fictions [Lewis] |
| 6079 | If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds [McGinn] |
| 14674 | Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N] |
| 14682 | Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N] |
| 14687 | Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N] |
| 13749 | Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J] |
| 18748 | Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew] |