more on this theme | more from this thinker
Full Idea
The idea of 'impossible worlds' was introduced into epistemic logic.
Gist of Idea
Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds
Source
Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 4)
Book Ref
'Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophical Logic', ed/tr. Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R [Bloomsbury 2014], p.19
A Reaction
Nathan Salmon seems interested in their role in metaphysics (presumably in relation to Meinongian impossible objects, like circular squares, which must necessarily be circular).
| 18739 | Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18741 | Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18740 | If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18745 | A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18744 | Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18746 | Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18747 | The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18748 | Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18750 | Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew] |