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Full Idea
Natural language includes connectives that are not truth-functional. In order for 'p because q' to be true, both p and q have to be true, but knowing the simpler sentences are true doesn't determine whether the larger sentence is true.
Gist of Idea
Natural language includes connectives like 'because' which are not truth-functional
Source
Vann McGee (Logical Consequence [2014], 2)
Book Ref
'Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophical Logic', ed/tr. Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R [Bloomsbury 2014], p.31
| 18751 | Natural language includes connectives like 'because' which are not truth-functional [McGee] |
| 18754 | Logically valid sentences are analytic truths which are just true because of their logical words [McGee] |
| 18755 | Validity is explained as truth in all models, because that relies on the logical terms [McGee] |
| 18753 | An ontologically secure semantics for predicate calculus relies on sets [McGee] |
| 18757 | Soundness theorems are uninformative, because they rely on soundness in their proofs [McGee] |
| 18760 | The culmination of Euclidean geometry was axioms that made all models isomorphic [McGee] |
| 18761 | Second-order variables need to range over more than collections of first-order objects [McGee] |
| 18762 | A maxim claims that if we are allowed to assert a sentence, that means it must be true [McGee] |