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Single Idea 18768

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects ]

Full Idea

Parmenides was correct - one cannot speak of that which is not, even to say that it is not. But one can speak of concepts and say of them that they do not correspond to anything real.

Gist of Idea

We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond

Source

C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.5)

Book Ref

'Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophical Logic', ed/tr. Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R [Bloomsbury 2014], p.71

A Reaction

[This summarises Alonso Church, who was developing Frege] This sounds like the right thing to say about non-existence, but then the same principle must apply to assertions of existence, which will also be about concepts and not things.

Related Idea

Idea 18767 Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA]

The 17 ideas with the same theme [status of 'objects' that can't actually exist]:

10945 Some philosophers say that in some qualified way non-existent things 'are' [Aristotle]
7756 Meinong said all objects of thought (even self-contradictions) have some sort of being [Meinong, by Lycan]
15781 The objects of knowledge are far more numerous than objects which exist [Meinong]
21531 Common sense agrees with Meinong (rather than Russell) that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true [Lackey on Russell]
21545 I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell]
21547 On Meinong's principles 'the existent round square' has to exist [Russell]
18777 If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell]
15783 Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist [Lycan on Quine]
16435 Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
18948 There is an object for every set of properties (some of which exist, and others don't) [Parsons,T, by Sawyer]
14617 Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker]
15792 Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
18852 A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen]
14392 Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks]
12448 Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni]
18766 's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA]
18768 We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA]