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Full Idea
Ontological quantifiers might just as well range over all the entities needed for the semantics. ...The minimal way would be to just stop calling '∃' an 'existential quantifier', and always read it as 'there is...' rather than 'there exists...'.
Gist of Idea
Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities
Source
C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.6)
Book Ref
'Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophical Logic', ed/tr. Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R [Bloomsbury 2014], p.74
A Reaction
There is no right answer here, but it seems to be the strategy adopted by most logicians, and the majority of modern metaphysicians. They just allow abstracta, and even fictions, to 'exist', while not being fussy what it means. Big mistake!
| 18763 | Basic variables in second-order logic are taken to range over subsets of the individuals [Anderson,CA] |
| 18764 | The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA] |
| 18765 | Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA] |
| 18766 | 's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA] |
| 18767 | Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA] |
| 18768 | We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA] |
| 18771 | Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA] |
| 18769 | Do mathematicians use 'existence' differently when they say some entity exists? [Anderson,CA] |
| 18770 | We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being [Anderson,CA] |