more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 18774
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
]
Full Idea
Definite descriptions seem to have a logical structure in a way that proper names do not.
Gist of Idea
Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure
Source
Bernard Linsky (Quantification and Descriptions [2014], 1.1.1)
Book Ref
'Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophical Logic', ed/tr. Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R [Bloomsbury 2014], p.80
A Reaction
Thus descriptions have implications which plain names do not.
Related Idea
Idea 18773
People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege]
The
21 ideas
with the same theme
[descriptions which seem to pick out a unique item]:
13733
|
Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms
[Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
|
6411
|
Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims
[Grayling on Russell]
|
10433
|
Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring
[Russell, by Sainsbury]
|
5385
|
The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description
[Russell]
|
18779
|
'The' is a quantifier, like 'every' and 'a', and does not result in denotation
[Montague]
|
5811
|
A definite description can have a non-referential use
[Donnellan]
|
5812
|
Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out
[Donnellan]
|
5814
|
'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence
[Donnellan]
|
13814
|
Definite desciptions resemble names, but can't actually be names, if they don't always refer
[Bostock]
|
13816
|
Because of scope problems, definite descriptions are best treated as quantifiers
[Bostock]
|
13817
|
Definite descriptions are usually treated like names, and are just like them if they uniquely refer
[Bostock]
|
13813
|
Definite descriptions don't always pick out one thing, as in denials of existence, or errors
[Bostock]
|
13848
|
We are only obliged to treat definite descriptions as non-names if only the former have scope
[Bostock]
|
10444
|
Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential
[Bach]
|
10425
|
Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer
[Sainsbury]
|
10438
|
Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position
[Sainsbury]
|
13398
|
We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it
[Jubien]
|
15414
|
The denotation of a definite description is flexible, rather than rigid
[Burgess]
|
18774
|
Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure
[Linsky,B]
|
9454
|
The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's
[Bealer]
|
10671
|
Plural definite descriptions pick out the largest class of things that fit the description
[Hossack]
|