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Single Idea 18775
[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
]
Full Idea
Russell's theory of definite descriptions allows us to avoid being ontologically committed to objects simply by virtue of using descriptions which seemingly denote them.
Gist of Idea
Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment
Source
report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Bernard Linsky - Quantification and Descriptions 1.1.2
Book Ref
'Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophical Logic', ed/tr. Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R [Bloomsbury 2014], p.81
A Reaction
This I take to be why Russell's theory is a famous landmark. I personally take ontological commitment to be independent of what we specifically say. Others, like Quine, prefer to trim what we say until the commitments seem sound.
The
46 ideas
from 'On Denoting'
18941
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Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions
[Russell, by Sawyer]
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4945
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Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise
[Russell, by Kripke]
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18942
|
Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object
[Russell, by Sawyer]
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7745
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Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names?
[McCullogh on Russell]
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15159
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The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper
[Russell, by Soames]
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10449
|
Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications
[Russell, by Bach]
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6411
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Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims
[Grayling on Russell]
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10433
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Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring
[Russell, by Sainsbury]
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11009
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Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false
[Read on Russell]
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1608
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The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed
[Russell, by Quine]
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7754
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Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity
[Russell, by Lycan]
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21529
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Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic
[Russell, by Lackey]
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6333
|
The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic
[Russell, by Horwich]
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6412
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Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique
[Grayling on Russell]
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7743
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Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names
[Russell, by McCullogh]
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7310
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Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names
[Russell, by Miller,A]
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12006
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Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems
[Russell, by Forbes,G]
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4569
|
Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties
[Russell, by Cooper,DE]
|
21549
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The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers
[Lackey on Russell]
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12796
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Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars
[Laycock on Russell]
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7532
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Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes
[Russell, by Monk]
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11988
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Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description
[Kaplan on Russell]
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6061
|
Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier
[Russell, by McGinn]
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18775
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Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment
[Russell, by Linsky,B]
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7533
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The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals
[Russell, by Monk]
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6063
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Russell can't attribute existence to properties
[McGinn on Russell]
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18777
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If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle
[Linsky,B on Russell]
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16385
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A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely
[Russell, by Recanati]
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4567
|
Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words
[Russell, by Cooper,DE]
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5810
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Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions
[Donnellan on Russell]
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11006
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Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions
[Read on Russell]
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18944
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Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F)
[Sawyer on Russell]
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18943
|
Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false
[Sawyer on Russell]
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7758
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'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement
[Russell, by Lycan]
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7757
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"Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier
[Russell, by Lycan]
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2612
|
Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates
[Russell, by Ayer]
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16987
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By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense'
[Russell, by Kripke]
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4570
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Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions
[Cooper,DE on Russell]
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16349
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Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible
[Russell, by Recanati]
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7313
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'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent)
[Russell, by Miller,A]
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7767
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The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions
[Russell, by Lycan]
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5772
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The idea of a variable is fundamental
[Russell]
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5774
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Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions
[Russell]
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5775
|
In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different
[Russell]
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5773
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The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..'
[Russell]
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21726
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In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance
[Russell]
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